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SEANA SHIFFRIN’S THINKER-BASED
THEORY OF FREE SPEECH: ELEGANT
AND INSIGHTFUL, BUT WILL IT WORK IN
PRACTICE?
James Weinstein*
INTRODUCTION
Seana Shiffrin offers a persuasive account of how free
speech is essential to the realization of several profound interests
that we have as thinkers. This approach avoids the usual sharp
separation of speaker and listener interests, a dichotomy that,
though useful in many ways, also shortchanges a full account of
important free speech interests. Another advantage of Seana’s
theory is that the interests that underlie it are all relatively
uncontroversial. Thus no one can reasonably deny that we have
vital interests in “self-development, self-knowledge, knowledge
of others, others’ knowledge of and respect for oneself,
knowledge of the environments in which they interact,
opportunities for the exercise of one’s intellectual capacities
including the imagination, and the intellectual prerequisites of
1
moral relations.” Similarly, there is no disputing that free speech
is essential to the realization of these basic values.
With respect to the interests of being known and respected
by others, Seana explains that “[i]f what makes one a distinctive
individual qua person is largely a matter of the contents of one’s
mind,” it follows that “to be known by others requires the ability
2
to transmit the contents of one’s mind to others.” As regards
self-knowledge and related interests, Seana correctly observes
that for many people “some thoughts may only be fully
identified and known to themselves if made linguistically or

* Amelia D. Lewis Professor of Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law, Arizona State University.
1. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 291 (2011).
2. Id. (emphasis in original).
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3

representationally explicit.” This tight connection between
speech and its underlying values gives Seana’s theory both a firm
foundation and commendable coherence. So aside from a few
4
quibbles, I endorse Seana’s poignant account of a cluster of
deep and abiding interests at the core of what makes us human
and their relation to free speech.
Still, for all its advantages, Seana’s theory is not, in my view,
a good theory of freedom of expression. In particular, I have
grave concerns about its ability to generate doctrinal rules that
will in practice adequately protect vital free speech interests,
especially those most in need of protection from governmental
suppression. Less fatally, but still a significant problem, Seana’s
lack of concern for doctrinal fit also detracts from the utility of
her theory. But before discussing these serious defects in Seana’s
theory, I want to say a few more words about its relative
strengths.
WAYS IN WHICH SEANA’S THEORY IS AN
IMPROVEMENT OVER PREVIOUS FREE SPEECH
THEORIES
Seana claims that her thinker-based theory provides “a
stronger and more coherent foundation for the most important
free speech protections than rival free speech theories, including
the more common speaker-based or listener-based autonomy
5
theories.” I am not sufficiently familiar with the various
colorations of autonomy-based theories to comment on this
claim as a global matter. I am confident, however, that Seana’s
theory has a more solid foundation than, say, Martin Redish’s
self-realization theory, which I have previously described as
6
“hovering in mid-air.” And in addition to having a deep and
secure philosophical foundation, Seana’s theory is, as I have

3. Id. at 292.
4. For instance, Seana’s claim that “speech and expression are the only precise
avenues by which one can be known as the individual one is by others,” id., is somewhat
of an overstatement. Observation of what a person does, especially the way she treats
other people, can often give us both a more precise and more accurate picture of “the
individual one is” than what an individual says, especially about herself. Also, I wonder if
Seana’s repeated emphasis on the importance of rationality and, in particular, her desire
to protect “rational deliberation” may not be in some tension with the extension of her
theory to encompass purely emotive expression. Id. at 300.
5. Id. at 284.
6. James Weinstein, Fools, Knaves, and the Protection of Commercial Speech: A
Response to Professor Redish, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 160 (2007).
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mentioned, rooted in a basic commitment that would garner nigh
unto universal consensus in any liberal society. As a sociological
matter, it thus has a firmer foundation than do several other
autonomy theories, including the theory Ed Baker defends in
this Symposium, which Ed himself admits rests on a “wildly
7
contested” account of autonomy. There is, as I elaborate in my
response to Ed, considerable advantage in basing a theory of
free speech in commitments that attract wide-spread acceptance
8
by both legal actors and the American public.
As I have also mentioned, Seana’s thinker-based theory
avoids dividing us into speakers or listeners, as is typical of other
theories, including the brilliant listener-based theory long ago
9
proposed (but later retracted) by Tim Scanlon. Not only does
Seana’s holistic approach more clearly identify interests that may
have been obscured by the traditional dichotomy, but it also
tends to make her theory more coherent than rival autonomy
theories. For example, Seana’s theory offers a deeper, more
satisfying explanation of the connection between free speech and
abstract art or music than do the other autonomy-based theories
with which I am familiar. And since autonomy theories as a
group more readily explain this connection than do democracybased theories, Seana’s thinker-based explanation increases this
10
generic advantage.
Despite these not insignificant advantages over other
theories, Seana’s thinker-based theory is nonetheless not overall
a very good theory of freedom of expression. First, by
forswearing any concern with its fit with current practices,
Seana’s theory is, despite its own admirable coherence, unlikely
to help make current doctrine more coherent. In addition, and
much more problematically, her theory would, if ever put into
practice, dilute the rigorous protection that current doctrine
provides political dissent. My disagreement with Seana is
therefore not as much theoretical as it is meta-theoretical,
7. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 269
(2011).
8. James Weinstein, Free Speech and Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 361, 383 n.80 (2011).
9. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972).
10. This is not to say that abstract art and music cannot be plausibly explained in
democratic terms, as Robert Post ably demonstrates. See Robert Post, Participatory
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 486 (2011). Although Robert’s
explanation may not be as straightforward as those offered by Seana’s thinker-based
theory or other autonomy theories, it is by no means “bizarrely indirect” as Seana
alleges. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285.
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stemming from our quite different conceptions of what a theory
of free speech should accomplish.
THE PROBLEM WITH PURELY NORMATIVE FREE
SPEECH THEORIES
Seana explains that it is not her goal in identifying the
theoretical foundation of free speech to “provide the best
theoretical account of our system or our current practices of
protecting (or failing to protect, as the case may be) free
11
speech.” In her view, articulating a theory among “more ideal
12
lines” provides a framework for assessing whether current
practices are justified, as well as supplying a measurement for
reform. The implication here seems to be that a theory’s ability
to normatively critique current practices and offer suggestions
for reform will be diminished if, in addition to identifying a
normatively appealing guiding value, it can also explain the basic
features of current practices in terms of this value. I do not see
13
why this should be the case. Indeed, as Vincent Blasi has aptly
observed, in some respects just the opposite is true, for “[t]he
explanatory project introduces one kind of discipline that can
stimulate normative insights and judgments that might not be
14
forthcoming in a zero-based normative inquiry.”
More importantly, as Vince also notes, “rationalization can
be a socially functional enterprise, at least when it does not
entirely pre-empt or crowd out independent critical
15
evaluation.” Echoing this view, I argue in my response to Ed
that a normatively appealing theory that also explains a great
deal of current doctrine can bring coherence to an area of the
law badly in need of a basic organizing principle. So though
Seana’s theory gets good marks for its own coherence, her lack
of interest in the explanatory dimension undercuts its usefulness
11. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 284 (emphasis in original).
12. Id.
13. For example, my view that a commitment to participatory democracy explains
the pattern of free speech decisions better than any other free speech value did not
hinder me from criticizing as wrongly decided the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as
the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 500–01 (2011).
14. Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech: A Response
to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. Rev. 531, 531 (2011).
15. Id. Vince also observes that “the kind of normative analysis that law professors
undertake is almost inevitably of the second-best variety. For lack of training and
temperament, few of us are capable of the purest forms of truth seeking.” Though I
heartily agree with this criticism, it does not apply to Seana, a trained moral philosopher.
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for bringing coherence to free speech doctrine. I will not,
however, attempt here to comprehensively assess how well her
thinker-based theory fits or deviates from current doctrine but
will merely note two basic shortcomings in its explanatory
power.
First, like most autonomy-based theories, it cannot easily
explain the especially rigorous protection that current doctrine
primarily reserves for political speech and other forms of public
16
discourse. More profoundly, unlike most democracy-based
theories of free speech, as well as Ed’s autonomy theory, which
focus on the proper relation between the individual and the
state, Seana’s theory would have a difficult time explaining why
free speech restrictions apply exclusively to state action and not
17
to private conduct. In any event, further examples are not
necessary to demonstrate that Seana’s theory is not nearly as
descriptively powerful a theory as one grounded in participatory
18
democracy. I turn now to a much more serious defect in Seana’s
theory: the inadequate protection it would likely provide vital
speech that is most in need of constitutional protection.
WEAKENING OF THE STRINGENT PROTECTION
NEEDED TO PROTECT POLITICAL DISSENT
Seana writes that “a decent regime of freedom of speech
must provide a principled and strong form of protection for
political speech and, in particular, for incendiary speech and
19
other forms of dissent.” I couldn’t agree more. And this is one
of several reasons why I favor a theory that easily explains the
particularly rigorous protection that free speech doctrine

16. “[Speech] concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government. Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on
public issues occupies the highest rung of the heirarchy of First Amendment values, and
is entitled to special protection.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); see Snyder
v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (repeating the above quotation with minor
deletions); see also Weinstein, supra note 13, at 499.
17. In her reply, Seana offers a plausible, though somewhat complicated and
tentative, explanation of how her theory might incorporate a state action requirement.
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 417 (2011). In contrast,
the participatory democracy theory that I propose can easily explain the state action
requirement: the legitimacy of the legal system depends on government not preventing
individuals from participating in the speech by which public opinion is formed.
Weinstein, supra note 13, at 497–98. The ease with which a free speech theory can
explain a desirable doctrinal feature should count in its favor. See supra text
accompanying notes 10–11.
18. See, e.g., Post, supra note 10, at 482–89; Weinstein, supra note 13, at 497-501.
19. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285 (emphasis added).
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currently provides political speech and other types of expression
essential to democratic self-governance, expression that the
Supreme Court and commentators have referred to as “public
20
discourse.” Seana’s theory would, however, afford “strong”
protection not just for public discourse but also
for religious speech, for fiction, art—whether abstract or
representational—and music, for diaries and other forms of
discourse meant primarily for self-consumption, and for that
private speech and discourse, e.g. personal conversations and
letters, crucial to developing, pursuing, and maintaining
21
personal relationships.

She specifies, moreover, that “all of these forms of expression should enjoy foundational protection, by which I mean
22
there should not be a lexical hierarchy of value between them.”
But in attempting to extend strong speech protection this widely,
and with no lexical hierarchy, the rigorous protection currently
afforded “political speech and, in particular, for incendiary
23
speech and other forms of dissent” will inevitably be weakened.
Current doctrine rigorously shields public discourse from
content regulation and provides such expression virtually
24
absolute protection from viewpoint discrimination. As I explain
25
in my response to Ed, the extraordinary strength of this
protection is in service of political legitimacy, a crucial
democratic value that is impaired when government excludes
individuals from expressing their views in public discourse.
Reflecting the foundational importance of the political
legitimacy it serves, this rigorous protection extends even to
public discourse that is likely to cause serious harm. For
example, Americans have a First Amendment right to
20. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971); Robert C. Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990).
21. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285. Some of this speech, for instance religious speech
by a preacher in a public square or from the pulpit, will easily come within the scope of
public discourse, as will fiction, art and music that is either overtly political, or a
commentary on social conditions or practices. In contrast, other forms of religious
speech, such as a teacher-initiated prayer in a public school, would not be considered
public discourse. See James Weinstein, An Overview of American Free Speech Doctrine
and its Application to Extreme Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 82–83
(Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, eds., 2009).
22. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285.
23. Id.
24. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 83, 85–86.
25. See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 380–84.
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vehemently condemn their nation’s involvement in a war, even if
such protests are likely to discourage our troops and encourage
the enemy; or to express racist or homophobic ideas that can
inflict emotional injury on minorities or encourage others to
26
discriminate against them. Crucially, any attempt to extend the
protection currently afforded public discourse, either across the
27
board to all expression, as many commentators urge, or even to
the more limited but still capacious range of speech
encompassed by Seana’s theory, will inevitably end up diluting
the fierce protection currently provided “incendiary speech and
28
other forms of dissent.”
To see how trying to protect, without hierarchical
distinction, all the expression encompassed by Seana’s theory
will dilute the rigorous protection currently afforded speech that
radically challenges the status quo, let’s first consider “forms of
29
discourse meant primarily for self-consumption.” Suppose that
a scientist, who has no interest in actually producing an
especially virulent biotoxin, wants purely out of intellectual
curiosity to figure out the process for doing so. As Seana
correctly notes, “thoughts may only be fully identified and
known to [the thinker] if made linguistically or representa30
tionally explicit.” Accordingly, this scientist wants to reduce her
thoughts about how to produce the toxin to written formulas,
drawings, and charts. But suppose further that Congress,
concerned that terrorist organizations might gain access to such
writings, has enacted a law forbidding anyone from making their
thoughts about a certain class of biotoxins “linguistically or
representationally explicit” in these ways.
Under Seana’s thinker-based theory such a governmental
restriction on scientific research would be a core breach of the
thinker’s right that she so ably describes. Due to the grave risk to
public safety that this research might produce, however, even if
the legal community were to accept Seana’s theory of the First
Amendment, most courts would likely uphold the restriction.
Indeed, I think Seana might agree that despite the “strong”
26. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 84–88.
27. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 140; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct.
1577, 1585 (2010).
28. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“To require a
parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could
invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment’s
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.”).
29. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285.
30. Id. at 292.
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protection that her theory provides for externalizing the content
of one’s mind, the government might legitimately suppress the
externalization of thoughts in this and similar cases presenting a
31
manifest risk of serious harm.
If, however, this risk of harm is sufficient to justify suppression of core thinker-based speech, then why would it not also be
32
sufficient, as courts in this country once thought it was, for
government to ban anti-war demonstrations likely to interfere
with this country’s war effort? Or, as is the case in most
European countries, why is it not grounds for banning the
33
expression of racist ideas, or the view that homosexuality is
34
sinful, in order to prevent the spreading of “poison that leads to
35
violence and discrimination” against minorities and homosexuals? But if Seana’s theory would permit the suppression of
scientific research that threatens public safety, then without
some “lexical hierarchy” in terms of the level of protection
between political speech and “the discourse meant primarily for
self-consumption” involved in scientific research, there would
seem to be no “principled” way to protect anti-war
demonstrations, racist or anti-homosexual speech, or any other
36
type of “incendiary speech and other forms of dissent” that can
be shown to pose a serious risk of harm.
Next, let’s consider “that private speech and discourse, e.g.
personal conversations and letters, crucial to developing,
37
pursuing, and maintaining personal relationships.” Even more
so than with speech meant primarily for self-consumption, the
protection afforded this wide array of communication cannot
plausibly be afforded the rigorous protection currently afforded
core political speech. Suppose, for instance, that Melvin is
31. Somewhat to my surprise, Seana states in her reply that she thinks such writings
should be protected. Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 435. Indeed, she apparently would not
only protect the production of these writings but their publication as well. Id. For a fuller
discussion of the constitutional limitations on governmental restrictions of scientific
research, see James Weinstein, Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of
Science, 15 SCI.& ENGINEERING ETHICS 407 (2009).
32. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding against
First Amendment challenge the conviction of anti-war protestors for distributing leaflets
that the Court found created a “clear and present danger” of obstructing the draft during
World War I).
33. See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 84–85.
34. See Hammond v. DDP, [2004] EWHC 69 (Eng. & Wales Admin).
35. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1596, 1642 (2010).
36. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285.
37. Id.
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interested in “developing and pursuing” a personal relationship
with women he finds particularly attractive whom he encounters
in public, be it on the street, in the park, or on the bus. The
problem is that Melvin wants to pursue the possibility of such
relationships by expressing in graphic detail to these women the
nature of his sexual attraction and the specific ways he would
like to act on this attraction.
Would courts applying Seana’s theory find Melvin’s speech
protected? Would Seana? Or would they, as would I, find that
despite the “strong” protection that should be afforded speech
by which people seek to “develop and pursue” relationships,
38
revealing in this way “the contents of one’s mind” can nonetheless be prohibited because of the harm it would likely cause
its intended audience? And if the harm to women to whom
Melvin expresses his thoughts were somehow deemed insufficient to overcome this protection, would Melvin also have the
right to reveal his thoughts to underage girls whom he meets on
39
the bus or in the park? And what about speech of this type
directed from an employer to an employee; from a professor to
student; or from a doctor to a patient?
If (as I suspect they would) courts and Seana were to find
that at least some, if not all, of this expression could be
prohibited because of the harm that it would likely cause, then,
for the reasons explained above, the rigorous protection
currently afforded political speech, especially “incendiary speech
and other forms of dissent,” would be significantly diluted. In
40
contrast, under the democracy-based theory I have defended,
such dilution would not occur: because Melvin’s speech is not
part of the expression by which people in a democratic society
govern themselves, it is not entitled to the truly strong protection
reserved for public discourse. Rather, it should be entitled to the
somewhat less rigorous protection befitting important autonomy
interests which can be outweighed by sufficiently weighty
countervailing state interests, including the protection of
individual autonomy interests of a different genus such as those
41
imperiled by Melvin’s expression.
38. Id. at 391.
39. Seana expressly declines to exclude children as relevant agents covered by her
theory. Id. at 287 n.9.
40. Weinstein, supra note 13.
41. Seana does not specify in her opening statement the precise level of protection
her theory would provide expression that her thinker-based principle encompasses. Her
reply, however, makes clear that the “strong protection” she has in mind is, like the
protection against viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse provided by current
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THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNAL LIMITATIONS
The dilution concern is premised on the view that both the
scientific and sexually-graphic expression discussed above is
within the scope of expression protected by Seana’s thinkerbased free speech principle. The scientific expression would
seem plainly within this thinker-based principle. But perhaps
there are one or more internal limitations on this principle that
would deny protection to the sexually-graphic speech directed to
others in the contexts I described. Consistent with Seana’s caveat
that she is offering just a sketch and not a detailed statement of a
42
thinker-based theory, she does not in her paper systematically
discuss such limitations. We can, however, infer some limitations
from her explanation for excluding “commercial and non-press,
43
business corporate speech” from her thinker-based principle.
But none of these limitations would seem to apply to Melvin’s
sexually-graphic speech.
First, Seana notes that commercial speech and the like does
“not involve in any direct or straightforward fashion the
44
revelation of individuals’ mental contents.” In contrast, the
problem with Melvin’s speech is that it reveals the contents of
his mind in too direct and straightforward a fashion. Next, Seana
observes that with commercial and ordinary corporate business
speech, “environmental pressures render more tenuous any
charitable presupposition that such speech is sincere, authentic,
45
or the product of autonomous processes.” Uninhibited expresdoctrine, very rigorous indeed, perhaps even absolute. Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 425.
Thus, she would apparently protect the right of scientists to publish formulas for virulent
bio-toxin. Id. at 435. Significantly, Seana does not disagree with my prediction that courts
applying her theory might not protect this and other types of harmful speech within the
ambit of her free speech principle, and concedes that my fear about dilution of core
political speech may be accurate. Id. at 426–27. She insists, however, that “[t]here is
something quite strange about criticizing the content of a theory on the ground that it will
be misunderstood, defied, or ignored in a particular institutional context or by particular
institutional actors.” Id. at 426. But the view that not all speech within the scope of a
thinker-based free speech principle must be protected regardless of consequences need
not necessarily reflect misunderstanding, etc. of her theory. Rather, it could well
represent reasonable disagreement about the strength of the protection such a capacious
principle can plausibly afford speech in the real world. I should also clarify that the
participatory democracy theory of free speech that I embrace is not as Seana suggests
just some strategically “barber[ed]” version of her theory, id., but rather a theory
grounded in a different basic value commitment. See Weinstein supra note 13, at 497–
504.
42. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 283.
43. Id. at 286.
44. Id. at 296.
45. Id. at 297.
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sion of sexual attraction and carnal desire, it is true, is an
extremely poor strategy for pursuing or developing a personal
relationship with a stranger; it is also true that, especially in the
workplace, men have too often regaled women with their sexual
thoughts and desires, not as a sincere or authentic means of
pursuing relationships, but as a way to make women feel
unwelcome in previously all-male environments or to assert
power over them. Still, for some misguided men the boorish
expression of sexual attraction and desire might nevertheless
represent an authentic and sincere attempt to pursue a sexual
46
relationship, and in all events there is no reason to believe that
such expression is anything other than “the product of
autonomous processes.”
The uninhibited expression of sexually graphic thoughts and
desires is but one example of types of speech that some might
use to pursue or develop relationships, but which the intended
audience would usually find highly disturbing. There are, it is
true, other internal limitations on Seana’s thinker-based theory
that would exclude problematic expression from the strong
protection her theory provides. For example, Seana explains that
“a thinker-based view of freedom of speech provides no
foundational protection for speech that aims to distort and
control the thinker’s rational processes of tracking and
47
understanding her environment.” To the extent, however, that
this limitation is applicable to public discourse, the very dilution
of protection that would result from lack of any internal
limitations reoccurs.
American political debate has always has been fraught with
distortion of just this sort and indeed such distortion is
unfortunately inevitable in political debate on hotly contested
topics. Recent examples include the discussion of health care
48
reform (recall the “death panel” scare), abortion (where both
49
sides routinely distort the facts), immigration reform (where a
46. Cf. id. at 300 n.39. Here Seana criticizes Tim Scanlon’s Millian Principle for
failing to distinguish “between false beliefs that result from fraud or intentional
misrepresentation and false beliefs that result from sincere communication (but poor
judgment, understanding or perception on the part of the speaker or the listener).” Id.
She states that the former (but apparently not the latter) should count as harms under a
thinker-based theory. Id.
47. Id. at 21 n.39.
48. Sharon Begley, The Five Biggest Lies in the Health Care Debate, NEWSWEEK,
September 7, 2009, at 42.
49. See, e.g., Dan Nowicki, Kyl’s ‘Corrected’ Figures on Abortion Faulty, too, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, April 17, 2011, at B3 (recounting how in retracting a wildly inaccurate claim
that he had made about the percentage of Planned Parenthood’s business involved
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misleading claim by Arizona’s governor about crimes committed
50
by illegal aliens was matched by a New York Times editorial’s
gross exaggeration of the scope of Arizona’s misguided attempt
51
to limit illegal immigration). But far more unfortunate than the
existence of such political distortions would be their punishment
whenever a prosecutor could prove that the speaker intended to
“distort and control the thinker’s rational processes of tracking
52
and understanding her environment.” Such an approach to free
speech would represent a giant step backward toward the
darkest days for civil liberties in our nation’s history, a time in
which courts routinely upheld convictions of anti-war protestors,
including for intentionally making “false” statements about the
53
reasons for American involvement in World War I.
An important criterion for judging a free speech theory is
whether it provides adequate protection for speech, “and, in
54
particular, for incendiary speech and other forms of dissent.”
Since the early days of the Republic there has been unremitting
pressure on popularly-elected officials, especially in times of
crisis, to suppress speech that vehemently challenges the status
quo. And, of course, these officials need no impetus from the
electorate to suppress speech critical of them or their policies. In
contrast, government in this country has not nearly as frequently
tried to suppress speech needed to effectuate “self-development,
55
self-knowledge, knowledge of others” or expression essential to
“opportunities for the exercise of one’s intellectual capacities
56
including the imagination.” This is not to say, of course, that the
thinker-based expression is never in danger of illegitimate
suppression by the government. Laws forcing students to salute
abortions, Senator Jon Kyl then proceeds to make a misleading claim about these
figures); Marie McCullough, The Facts Behind ‘Partial-Birth’ Debate as the Senate
Prepares to Take up the Abortion Issue Again, Some Questions Are Answered, PHILA.
INQUIRER, September 16, 1998, at A01 (noting that Ron Fitzsimmons, executive director
of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers, confessed that he had “lied through his
teeth'' in claiming that partial-birth abortions are only rarely performed).
50. Rob Margetta, Borderline Confusion: Defining ‘Safe’, 68 CQ WEEKLY 1802
(2010).
51. See Editorial, Another Bad Idea from Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010,
at WK7.
52. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 300 n.39.
53. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 251 (1920) (upholding the
conviction of socialists for declaring, among other allegedly false statements, that
America entered World War I to protect J.P. Morgan’s loans to the Allies).
54. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 285.
55. Id. at 291.
56. Id.
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the flag discussed by Seana are a good example of undue
57
interference with the realm of thought. But such illegitimate
intrusions into the realm of thought and intellect can be
prevented by meaningful protection far more flexible than the
fierce and unyielding protection currently afforded political
dissent.
CONCLUSION
For all its elegance and insight, Seana’s theory is not a good
theory of free speech, let alone the best one, if measured by the
free speech doctrine it will likely produce. A much better theory
is one that reserves the most rigorous protection for the speech
by which individuals participate in the democratic process, while
at the same time providing meaningful but more flexible
protection for other important free speech values, including
58
important autonomy interests. Though Seana’s theory cannot
be counted on to afford adequate protection for political dissent
and other forms of public discourse, it does render an admirably
coherent and particularly appealing account of the autonomy
interests that should be—and for the most part already are—
59
protected by the First Amendment. To this extent, Seana’s
thinker-based theory does make a valuable contribution both to
the understanding and proper functioning of the American
system of freedom of expression.

57. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 301 (discussing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
58. See Weinstein, supra note 13.
59. Or perhaps more appropriately by the Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence. See id. at 655–56.

